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The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making
The literature on ideology and decision making offers conflicting expectations about how judges’
ideology should affect their votes in cases that raise many legal issues. Using cases from the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, I examine the strength of ideology as a predictor of sincere voting in
single and multi-issue cases and test whether the same effect for ideology can be seen for liberal
and conservative judges. For all judges, ideology yields a larger effect as the number of issues
increases; however, conservative judges are much more likely than liberal judges to cast sincere
votes at all levels of complexity.
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The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making
A wide range of literature in political science emphasizes the centrality of ideology in
explaining political elites’ behavior. Studies of both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have
shown the ways that institutional constraints and norms can shape the opportunities for
ideologically driven behavior, at both the agenda-setting stage (e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn
1999; Krehbiel and Rivers 1998) as well as the final decision stage (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993;
Poole and Rosenthal 1991). In studies of legislative behavior, ideology is viewed as a conscious,
explicit motivation for individual behavior (Krehbiel 1993, 1998), though not necessarily the
only possible motivating factor (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox and McCubbins
1993; Kingdon 1973). This way of understanding ideology as an acceptable basis for political
decision making reflects the values underlying elective office; namely, that because the
electorate chooses legislators on the basis of their ideological positions on policy matters, it is
then desirable for public officials to act in a manner consistent with their ideological position.i
However, in the context of judicial institutions (and particularly the federal judiciary),
there are strong norms opposing a conscious, explicit reliance on ideology as an appropriate
basis for judicial decision making. Like the norms about acceptable legislative behavior, the
norms about judicial actors also reflect the values underlying the selection mechanism used,
which emphasizes independence and insulation from public opinion. In this paper, I move away
from the debate over whether ideology should matter in judicial decision making and connect to
a more recent segment of research that acknowledges two points. First, due to their legal
education and professional socialization, legal decision makers believe that law matters, and this
has consequences for how judges behave (Braman 2006; Baum 1997), particularly in
institutional contexts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. Second, this emerging body of
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research acknowledges that it is vital to begin exploring the process by which ideological frames
operate to influence legal decision making (i.e., asking, how ideology affects legal decision
making, rather than, does ideology affect legal decision making).
Competing perspectives exist about how ideology functions in judicial decision making.
Braman and Nelson (2007) characterize these approaches as either “top down” or “bottom up.”
In the “top down” model (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993), outcome decisions are made first and
then affect which legal explanations are offered as a rationalization. In the “bottom up” model
(Baum 1999; Rowland and Carp 1996), judges’ attitudes behave like “information filters [that
affect] … micro-decisions that occur in the process of legal reasoning” (Braman and Nelson
2007, 942).
I build on this literature by exploring the cognitive function that ideology plays in “noisy”
decision-making environments. Specially, I examine the role of ideology for appellate judges in
“complex” cases that raise many legal issues, compared to cases that present fewer dimensions.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, I discuss the major existing theoretical
perspectives on the function of ideology in judicial decision making, highlighting differences in
how ideology is defined in each. Next, I discuss how ideological frames might be used,
unconsciously, to simplify judicial decision making under these conditions, and suggest several
hypotheses. Testing these on a sample of published decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from
1982 to 2002, I find evidence that increased complexity is not associated with ideologically
“sincere” voting for liberals, but that it is for conservative judges. I conclude by discussing the
implications of my results for the “law versus ideology” debate about judging.
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Ideology and Judicial Decision Making
Prominent models
The function of ideology is viewed quite differently by the prominent political science
models of judging. In the attitudinal model articulated by Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002),
ideology is the central explanatory factor for judicial decision making on the U.S. Supreme
Court. Under this account, judges make decisions based on their ideology: “the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of
the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative;
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86).
Attitudinalist scholars use the word “ideology” interchangeably with several other terms: “policy
preferences” (Rohde and Spaeth 1976), “policy goals” (Klein 2002; Baum 1997), “ideal points”
(Schubert 1965, 1974), “attitudes” (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Spaeth and Peterson 1971),
and “values” (Pritchett 1948). As described by Harold Spaeth (1972), the way ideology enters
into the judicial decision-making process is a multi-step process. First, a judge must hold an
attitude, defined as “an interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation” (65). Judges will
have attitudes about the parties involved in the case, as well as about the central legal issue in the
case (Segal and Spaeth 2002). When these attitudes interact, they will influence a judge’s
behavior.ii The attitudinal model implies that ideology serves as a simplifying mechanism in
decision making: when judges possess attitudes about the parties and the legal issue in the case,
the range of possible outcomes is constrained. Characterizations of the attitudinal model
sometimes assume that this is a conscious process—what Gillman (2001) refers to as “low
politics”—though Segal and Spaeth appear to be agnostic on whether judges are fully aware of
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this tendency (Baum 2009), focusing less on how this mechanism works than on whether the
evidence is consistent with decisions based on policy preferences.iii
In contrast, empirical work that employs the “legal model” de-emphasizes the role of
ideology in decision making, instead focusing on legal variables, such as precedent (Kritzer and
Richards 2003; Richards and Kritzer 2002), statutes (Cook 1977), doctrinal cues (George and
Epstein 1992), and fact patterns (Segal 1984).iv Another branch of scholarship classified under
the rubric of the “legal model” comes from legal professionals and law school faculty and is
typically (though not always) distinct from empirical scholarship in taking a strong normative
position that judges can and should avoid relying on ideology in any way in their decisions. A
common criticism of such work is that it does not yield testable propositions (Cross 1997; Smith
1994; Segal and Spaeth 1993).
Finally, strategic models argue that judges possess multiple goals, one of which is to
achieve their preferred policy outcome. Under the strategic model, ideology is said to matter
within constraints, but perhaps more importantly, it posits a conscious recognition of attitudes
and reliance on them in decision making. For instance, Epstein and Knight (1998) refer to
judges as “policy seekers” and note that individual judges have been quoted saying that they
think they can influence public policy.
In two of these three major approaches, then, ideology plays a prominent role in
explaining judicial decisions. However, the specific causal mechanism by which ideology works
to affect judicial decisions remains poorly understood. In the section that follows, I discuss what
we know about the role of ideology in cognition and how that knowledge might strengthen our
accounts of judicial decision making.
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Ideology and Cognition
Research in political psychology has generally characterized ideology as a coherent
organizing framework for understanding the world (Converse 1964) that, at least in part, reflects
individuals’ psychological needs (Jost et al. 2003).v Several insights from this literature have
immediate relevance for our inquiry into the bases of judicial decision making. First, one
common perspective on ideology’s role in cognition is that ideology can serve as a heuristic
device, providing a cognitive “shortcut” when time and informational resources are scarce.
Under this view, ideology’s role in decision making is likely to go unnoticed by the decision
maker – that is, the decision maker unconsciously relies upon his or her own ideology as a guide.
Related to this perspective is research that finds an effect for ideology in evaluating the
credibility of sources; for example, conservative individuals are more likely to accept
information from a conservative source as reliable than they would if they associated the
information as coming from a liberal source, and vice versa (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman
2005; Lupia 2002).
Additionally, an individual’s ideological position may be associated with a particular
cognitive style in terms of the differentiation between and integration of concepts (Tetlock
1983). A robust debate persists between scholars who argue that cognitive simplicity is
associated primarily with conservatism (Sidanius 1985, 1988; Tetlock 1983, 1984) and those
who argue for a more symmetrical relationship between ideological extremity and cognitive
simplicity (Ray 1973; Rokeach 1960; Shils 1954). However, more recent work has tended to
find more support consistent with the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis (Altemeyer 1998; but see
Gruenfeld 1995). Overall, what unites this body of literature is the premise that ideology is an
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important, and perhaps unavoidable, factor in influencing the content and manner of decision
making.
In contrast, some legal scholars have argued that that judges’ professional training
“inoculates” them from the cognitive phenomena observed by psychologists in studies of nonjudges’ decision making (Schauer 2007; but see Spellman 2007). This is no doubt due to the
strong norm in legal education against relying upon ideology as a basis for legal decisions.
However, research using law students and magistrate judges as experimental subjects suggests
that neither law school training nor practicing the law may be enough to overcome common
cognitive errors, or to make ideology entirely irrelevant (Braman and Nelson 2007; Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001). On the other hand, Braman’s 2006 experimental study on
ideology and the separability of merits and threshold issues concluded that motivated reasoning,
by itself, is insufficient as an explanation of legal decision making; law and legal norms appear
to have some ability to constrain decision makers from acting solely on their ideological
attitudes.vi
Of course, the function of ideology in decision making differs depending on the
institutional context. Zorn and Bowie (2010) show that judicial ideology plays an increasingly
larger role in decisional outcomes at each level in the federal judicial hierarchy. Compared to
the U.S. Supreme Court, ideology plays a less prominent role in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, for
several reasons. First, as an intermediate court that must honor litigants’ right to one appeal, the
Courts of Appeals are sent more “cut-and-dried” cases to decide, which require only
straightforward applications of existing law and often result in unanimous rulings. Second,
ideology may be less relevant for circuit judges because, unlike the Supreme Court’s Rule of
Four for granting certiorari, circuit judges do not select the cases they hear. Substantial
8

empirical support has demonstrated that Supreme Court justices’ votes at the certiorari stage are
consistent with ideological preferences (e.g., Boucher and Segal 1995), but the practice of
random assignment in the Courts of Appeals makes it impossible for a circuit judge to “cherry
pick” a case based on ideological grounds. Finally, because of strong institutional norms in the
Courts of Appeals favoring consensus and requiring majority rule, vii the ideology of the panel’s
median judge is especially important in influencing the tenor and ideological direction of the
panel’s majority opinion (Kastellac 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Tiller and
Cross 1999). However, recent work on the Courts of Appeals has also pointed to systematic
differences between Democratic and Republican judicial appointees in the degree to which their
ideological preferences are constrained by statutory language (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine
2006). Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are less likely than their Republican
colleagues to cast sincere votes in criminal cases, while Republican appointees are less likely to
vote sincerely in discrimination cases.
Institutional context is also important in terms of understanding the coping strategies and
heuristics used by decision makers. By three measures, it is abundantly clear that circuit court
judges have very full plates.viii On average, each year from 1983 to 2002, the Courts of Appeals
averaged 4,092 filings, 2,071 cases terminated on their merits, and 26 merits cases per judge
(Lindquist 2007). One appellate judge observed, “Caseload pressures greatly reduce one's sense
of satisfaction with the job. I feel dirty at the end of the day, having made many decisions
without time for proper reflection and analysis” (Robel 1990). Another lamented: “It’s huge.
It’s absolutely huge. And it does affect the way you work. Because when I was working on 1012 cases a month, it was far different than working on 30-40 cases. You have to give priority to
certain cases; you’re always behind.”ix Indeed, psychological research on group decision making
9

suggests that stress can cause more simplified, heuristic-based decision making (Karau and Kelly
1992).
In the empirical scholarship focusing specifically on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the
relationship between case complexity, ideology, and judicial behavior has not been directly
addressed. Rather, when complexity has been considered, it has been as a control variable. For
example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) use two measures as proxies for complexity
in their study of dissensus on appellate panels: the presence of a cross appeal and the number of
headnotes coded in the Songer (2002) database.x They find that the number of legal issues, as
indicated by the latter measure, is positively related to the likelihood of a concurrence, compared
to joining the majority opinion, but is not related to the likelihood of a dissent. Other work
(Lindquist, Martinek, and Hettinger 2007) finds that case complexity (as measured by a factor
analysis of legal issues and opinion length) is a significant predictor of decisions to affirm in part
and reverse in part (“mixed” outcomes). Taken together, these results suggest that as cases
present more dimensions, judges are more likely to respond with fewer clear-cut decisions (i.e.,
separate opinions and split decisions).
While, overall, the literature on ideology and cognition does not provide a clear set of
expectations about the effects of judicial ideology in complex cases, it is possible to draw a few
general conclusions from the extent research. First, context is important, particularly in terms of
decision making under stressful conditions. It is reasonable to assume that, given the heavy
caseloads faced by appellate panels, unconscious reliance on heuristics is probably a common
response to that decision environment. Second, ideology operates differently for individuals at
different points in the ideological spectrum. This can be seen both in the political psychology
literature and in work specifically examining federal appellate judges (Randazzo, Waterman, and
10

Fine 2006). Building on these insights, in the section that follows, I lay out several hypotheses to
test the competing contentions suggested by the literature.
Theoretical Expectations
The central assumption underlying this inquiry is that we should not expect ideology to
have a uniform effect across all judges or all cases. If we imagine that ideology functions like a
filter, it should simplify the decision making process by guiding judges as they prioritize
different pieces of information. As more and more pieces of information flow into that filter,
two responses are possible. Because of the stress associated with greater levels of complexity,
ideology could become an even more influential heuristic, triggering more ideologically
consistent voting as response to uncertainty (Karau and Kelly 1992). Alternatively, as
complexity rises, it is possible that too many pieces of information would overwhelm an
ideological framework, rendering it less meaningful as a filter and producing less ideologically
consistent voting behavior. Each of these competing explanations is represented in the two
hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 1: In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a stronger effect on a
judge’s vote than in cases with a single issue.
Hypothesis 2: In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a weaker effect on a
judge’s vote than in cases with a single issue.
In addition, the political psychology literature gives us reason to question whether
ideology performs an equivalent function for ideologically extreme judges (both liberal and
conservative) as well as those who are moderate. Past research on political elites offers mixed
conclusions. In early studies examining U.S. senators and Supreme Court justices, Tetlock
(1983) and Tetlock et al. (1985) found that liberal and moderate political elites exhibited more
11

integrative complexity in their written and spoken rhetoric than conservatives. However, a more
recent examination of the Supreme Court (Gruenfeld 1995) found that this difference between
liberals and conservatives was an artifact of majority opinion status, not purely ideology.
Finally, one recent study of the Courts of Appeals found ideological differences in which
substantive areas of statutory law constrain judges, again suggesting that the function of ideology
may differ depending on one’s ideological position (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 2006). The
same study also found that ideological extremity was only associated with sincere voting by
Republican appointees, but not Democratic appointees.
To further examine whether ideology mediates the relationship between complexity and
sincere voting, I also introduce competing hypotheses that test whether any conditional
relationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical.
Hypothesis 3: In cases with multiple issues, judges with strong conservative preferences
will be more likely to cast sincere votes than judges with strong liberal preferences.
Hypothesis 4: In cases with multiple issues, judges with more extreme ideological
positions will be more likely to cast sincere votes than moderate judges will in such cases.
Data and Methods
The data used for these analyses are derived from the Multi-User Database on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, transformed so that a judge-vote was the unit of analysis (Songer 1997;
Kuersten and Haire 2006) for the eleven numbered circuits for the years 1982 to 2002. After
excluding cases in which no legal issues were coded, this yielded a total of 11,392 judge-votes
for analysis, all of which came from three-judge panels.
To untangle the relationship between complexity and ideological voting, the dependent
variable in the analysis predicts the likelihood of a judge casting a “sincere” vote. To ascertain
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what constitutes an ideologically “sincere” vote, the ideological direction of each vote must first
be determined. The U.S. Courts of Appeals database contains this information, labeling each
vote as “liberal,” “conservative,” “mixed,” or “could not be classified.” Ideological
directionality is determined relative to each issue area; for example, in criminal cases, a vote in
favor of the government is coded as a conservative outcome, while in economic regulation cases,
a vote for the government is coded as a liberal outcome. (More detailed information about
coding of each issue area can be found in the database codebook, available at
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm). “Mixed” outcomes that supported both parties or that
could not be clearly classified in ideological terms were omitted from this analysis. xi
Next, following previous research that has uncovered significant differences between
Democratic and Republican appointees, the dependent variable is coded as a “1” (sincere) if a
Republican appointee cast a conservative vote or a Democratic appointee cast a liberal vote. It is
coded as a “0” (not sincere) if a Republican appointee cast a liberal vote, or a Democratic
appointee cast a conservative vote. Finally, because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent
variable, I estimate a logistic regression model with robust standard errors.xii
Independent Variables
In order to evaluate the relationship between complexity and ideologically sincere voting,
it is important to control for judicial ideology. A continuous variable is superior to a
dichotomous approach because it allows for a more precise and nuanced measure as well as
allowing distinctions to be made between ideological extremes and moderates (Epstein, Martin,
Segal, and Westerland 2007). For these reasons, I use the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001)
ideology scores, which range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative) and reflect the
preferences of the appointing president or the home state senator(s) when senatorial courtesy is
13

present. However, I adjust this measure somewhat to reflect bargaining between the president
and the home state senator by averaging the two NOMINATE scores when senatorial courtesy is
present. The values for Judge Ideology in this sample range from -.689 to .6, with a median
value of .25. To further distinguish among judges ideologically in terms of being “moderate” or
“extreme,” I then created a dummy variable called Extreme that is equal to 1 if the judge was at
the 75th percentile or greater among other appointees of the same party, and 0 if they fell below
the 75th percentile.xiii To account for the possibility that ideologically sincere voting may be
driven by whether the judge is a part of the majority coalition on the circuit, Majority is equal to
1 if the judge was of the same party as 51 percent or more of the circuit, zero if the circuit was
evenly balanced (50-50), and -1 if the judge was a part of the minority party on the circuit.
Both practitioners and academics have developed measures of case complexity, albeit for
different purposes. Court management efforts to measure case complexity have generally been
geared toward improving efficiency in the disposition of cases, though such efforts are not
uniform across all circuits (McKenna, Hooper, and Clark 2000). In contrast, political scientists
and empirical legal scholars have generally included various measures of case complexity as
control variables in their analyses, rather than as the central explanatory variable (e.g., Lindquist,
Martinek, and Hettinger 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006).
For the purposes of the present inquiry, I focus on the aspect of complexity that relates to
the number of legal concepts involved in a case (see Johnson 1987). This variable is a count of
the number of legal concepts identified in an opinion, taken from the Multi-User Database on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Kuersten and Haire 2006; Songer 1997). Under each area of law
(criminal, civil disputes between private entities, civil disputes between private entities and
government, and administrative agency appeals), coders identified whether specific legal issues
14

were present in the opinion or not. (The legal concepts coded for each area of law appear in the
appendix.) For this analysis, concepts mentioned in the opinion were coded as 1 and zero if
otherwise, then summed.xiv Legal Complexity ranges from 1 to 13 issues, with a median of 2
issues (standard deviation = 1.29). To adjust for the skewed distribution of this variable, I
transformed the raw number by taking its square root, which changes the range to run from 1 to
3.6. I also included a dummy variable to control for the presence of a cross appeal, which by
definition, raises multiple issues, since both parties are appealing separate issues from the district
court’s decision (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006). Cross Appeal and Legal Complexity
tap into different aspects of multiple issues, as evidence by their low correlation (r = .09).
To gauge whether the effect of ideology on sincere voting is conditioned by complexity, I
included two interaction terms. The first, Ideology*Legal Complexity, examines whether
differences exist between liberal and conservative judges in how case complexity conditions
their vote. The second multiplicative term, Extreme*Legal Complexity, tests whether differences
exist between ideological moderates and extremes with respect to this conditional relationship.
Additionally, I include several control variables. I control for the participation of the
U.S. government, which retains a strong advantage in litigation (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire
1999). The variable U.S. government takes the value of -1 if the United States is a party and
takes the position contrary to the judge’s preferences, zero if the United States is not a party in
the case, and +1 if the United States is involved and takes a position that is consistent with a
judge’s “sincere” position. To account for the court’s overwhelming tendency to affirm lower
courts’ decisions, Lower Court is equal to one if the district court ruled in the direction consistent
with the judge’s preferences, and equal to zero if it ruled in the opposing direction. Finally,
because a judge’s propensity to cast a “sincere” vote may be a function of the ideological
15

positions of his or her colleagues on the panel, I created a variable that is the absolute value of
the distance between the majority opinion author and the panel median (Panel Distance).
[Table 1 about here]
Findings
Table 1 displays the results from the logit models.xv In the first column of results (Model
1), the model presented does not include any interaction terms. Here, we can get a sense of how
ideology and complexity affect sincere voting separately, before examining whether they have a
conditional effect. We can see that Legal Complexity by itself does not exert a statistically
significant effect on sincere voting, although the coefficient is positively signed. Conservative
judges are significantly more likely than their liberal colleagues to cast ideologically sincere
votes, and counter to expectations, moderate judges have a higher probability of voting sincerely
than more ideologically extreme judges. Looking at the other control variables, when the
position of the lower court is consistent with a judge’s preferences, or when the U.S. government
takes a position consistent with a judge’s preferences, it is more likely that the judge will cast an
ideologically sincere vote. In particular, the Lower Court variable exerts a very large effect; with
all other variables held at their median values, a one-unit change in Lower Court (from zero to
one) causes the likelihood of a sincere vote to jump from .51 to .95. This finding reflects the
tendency of appellate judges to affirm lower court decisions, but also emphasizes, consistent
with the attitudinal model, that it is easier to agree with the district court when that outcome is
consistent with one’s ideological preferences. The Majority variable is positive and significant,
with a relatively large effect as well. When all other variables are held at their median or modal
values, moving from being in the minority coalition to the majority coalition within the circuit
increases the probability of a sincere vote from .36 to .51.
16

[Figure 1 about here]
In the second column of Table 1, the model is estimated with an interaction term between
Ideology and Legal Complexity, which allows us to evaluate the first three hypotheses. When the
model is estimated including this multiplicative term, the results show that Ideology*Legal
Complexity is not statistically significant. However, because the statistical and substantive
significance for interaction terms are not always accurately reflected by the coefficients and
standard errors reported in model output, it is important to calculate the marginal effects and
standard errors for scenarios of interest (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Norton, Wang, and
Ai 2004). Setting all other variables at their median values and the lower court variable at zero, I
calculated the marginal effects for both moderates and extremes as the Legal Complexity variable
increased from its minimum (1) to its maximum (3.6) for judges at the 25th and 75th percentile of
ideology. Figure 1 shows the conditional effect of legal complexity on ideology for both liberal
and conservative judges. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the probability of a sincere vote
increases somewhat for all judges as the number of issues in a case rises. This allows us to reject
Hypothesis 2 (which predicted the opposite result). Additionally, Figure 1 clearly shows that
conservative judges are significantly more likely to cast a sincere vote than liberal judges,
supporting Hypothesis 3. Over the range of legal issues, the probability for conservative judges
increases from .62 to .65, while the probability for liberal judges increases from .35 to .39. At
the highest levels of complexity (3.4 and higher), however, there are no meaningful differences
between conservative and liberal judges. xvi
[Figure 2 about here]
In the third column of results in Table 1 (Model 3), an interaction term between Extreme
and Legal Complexity allows us to test Hypothesis 4; namely, that ideologically extreme judges
17

will be more likely to cast sincere votes in conditions of higher complexity than moderate judges.
The results for the control variables in this model are identical to those in Model 1, and the
coefficient on the interaction term Extreme*Complexity fails to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. However, when the marginal effects and standard errors are calculated
(with all variables held at their median values) and graphed, moderates are actually more likely
than ideological extremes to cast sincere votes when a case has low to medium levels of
complexity. (At higher levels of complexity, the confidence intervals overlap, signifying that the
two groups are no longer statistically distinguishable from one another.) Over the range of Legal
Complexity, however, we see no evidence for either moderates or extremes that complexity
increases (or decreases) the likelihood of sincere voting, as the relationship is flat. Thus, we can
conclude that Hypothesis 4 is not supported, since ideological extremity is not positively related
to sincere voting.
[Table 2 about here]
Finally, we examine the possibility that the findings are an artifact of the type of case
(civil or criminal) being heard. Since a large portion of the appellate docket is made up by
criminal cases, which are typically affirmed at a higher rate than other types of cases (Lindquist
2007), one possible explanation for the findings above is that conservative judges’ greater
propensity to vote sincerely is being driven by case type. Table 2 shows the results from
additional analyses that examine civil and criminal cases separately.xvii Models 4 and 5 are
estimated including the interaction between Ideology and Legal Complexity and between
Extreme and Legal Complexity to test for conditional effects within these subsamples.xviii In
these models, Extreme*Legal Complexity is the only statistically significant conditional
relationship, and it only is significant in civil cases in a relatively narrow range. Moderates are
18

more likely than ideological extremists to cast sincere votes in civil cases and increasingly more
so as Legal Complexity increases from its minimum to its 90th percentile value. (Graphs for
other, non-significant interaction terms omitted because of space). Consequently, it does not
appear that the results for the conditional effect of complexity on ideology that we saw above are
being driven by outcomes in criminal cases.
[Figure 3 about here]
In sum, we can draw several conclusions from these findings. First, as shown in Figure
1, we find evidence that ideology has a stronger influence as a case contains more issues, though
the effect is not overwhelming. This suggests that ideology can be a somewhat effective filter in
simplifying the decision environment as it becomes more “crowded” with information.
In addition, Figure 1 shows that differences exist between liberal and conservative judges
with respect to the general propensity for casting ideologically sincere votes, and that these
differences are not a function of ideological extremism. Specifically, conservative judges are
more likely to cast sincere votes across the board and are increasingly likely to do so as a case
becomes more complex. This provides some tentative support for the work of some political
psychologists (see Jost et al. 2003a for an overview), who have argued that conservatism is
composed of a number of underlying traits (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity and the need for order,
structure, and closure) that are associated with eliminating nuance and simplifying complex
phenomena. Obviously, the normative implications of these studies are quite controversial (see
Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Jost et al. 2003b), but given the results shown here, we can at least
say that conservatism appears to help conservative judges make ideologically consistent
decisions in the midst of “noisy” decision environments. Liberal judges, too, rely more on their
ideology as cases become more complex, but their ideological position does not yield nearly as
19

large an effect, predicting a sincere vote only about one-third of the time. This difference
between liberal and conservative judges cannot be explained by the attitudinal model alone, since
it suggests that ideology acts as a stronger filter for conservative judges than it does for liberal
judges.
Discussion
Prior research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has demonstrated that, rather than pitting
law against ideology as an explanatory mechanism, elements of both factors play an important
part in explaining judicial decision making (Klein 2002; Segal, Songer, and Cameron 1995).
Much of the time, circuit court judges come to the same conclusion, liberal and conservative
alike, perhaps because the law is often easily applied to many appeals—and also because the
decision environment promotes consensual decision-making norms. On the other hand, the
evidence shows that measures of judge ideology, both at the individual and panel level, are
consistently significant predictors of voting behavior.
The findings described herein have important implications for the “attitudes versus law”
debate among judicial scholars. While much of the work in this subfield has focused on
modeling law as a uniform constraint, this study considers how the law matters from an
information processing perspective. I argue that it is vital to consider the complexity of cases
when making arguments about the relative power of law or ideology as explanatory mechanisms.
The results show that the effect of ideology as a “filter” grows increasingly stronger as case
complexity increases, for all judges. However, conservative ideology is associated with a higher
tendency to cast sincere votes at all levels of complexity, compared to liberal ideology. The lack
of equivalence between the two groups is notable, given earlier work showing that Republican
and Democratic judicial appointees are constrained differently by statutory language in criminal
20

case and employment cases. These findings underscore the importance of understanding the
specific psychological mechanisms at work when we talk about ideology’s role in judging, rather
than relying upon “black box” accounts of judicial decision making.xix
Certainly, there are some limitations to this study that bear mentioning. Using the
number of legal issues in the opinion without also having access to the accompanying briefs
means that we are unable to observe issue suppression and other informal mechanisms that
panels use to reach consensus when a case presents many elements. Indeed, some level of issue
suppression is routine for judges, who regularly condense lengthy legal briefs with long lists of
issues into relatively pithy opinions (Haire and Moyer 2008). Unfortunately, most circuits do not
make their briefs electronically available, and even in those circuits that do, access to briefs is
gained only through a fee-based service called PACER. Future research should explore the role
that these briefs play in judges’ decision making in the federal appellate courts. Additionally,
research should examine other possible operationalizations of a “legal issue”: for example, to
test whether the effects differ across merits and procedural issues.
The lively debate over judicial decision making will no doubt continue for many years to
come. Nevertheless, scholars should continue to explore the nuances of both legal and
psychological influences in order to gain a fuller understanding of the process of decision
making, not just outcomes.
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Table 1: Likelihood of a Sincere Vote
U.S. Courts of Appeals (1982-2002)
Model 1
Coefficient
(Robust SE)
Ideology and complexity variables
Legal complexity
.017
(.077)
Ideology
.956**
(.085)
Extreme ideology
-.445**
(.074)
Ideology*legal
-complexity
Extreme*legal
-complexity
Control variables
Non-unanimous
.324*
(.132)
Majority party in
.306**
circuit
(.036)
Cross appeal
-.055
(.138)
U.S. government
.995**
(.056)
Lower court decision
2.97**
(.088)
Ideo. distance from
.050
panel
3(.134)
Constant
-.542**
(.116)
N
11392
Prob > chi2
p < .001
Pseudo R2
.4297

Model 2
Coefficient
(Robust SE)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Robust SE)

.014
(.077)
1.02**
(.159)
-.444**
(.074)
-.030
(.062)
--

-.002
(.091)
.955**
(.085)
-.494**
(.139)
--

.323*
(.132)
.306**
(.036)
-.054
(.138)
.996**
(.057)
2.97**
(.088)
.051
(.134)
-.538**
(.116)
11392
p < .001
.4297

.325*
(.132)
.306**
(.036)
-.055
(.138)
.995**
(.056)
2.97**
(.088)
.049
(.134)
-.515**
(.135)
11392
p < .001
.4297

.024**
(.056)

Notes: **p < .01, *p < .05, two-tailed tests.
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Figure 1. Interaction of Judge Ideology and Legal Complexity.
Note: Ideology ranges -.4 to .4 (the interquartile range), and the number of legal issues runs
from its minimum to maximum value. All continuous variables set at their median values.
Dummy variables set at moderate judge, in the majority of the circuit, lower court decision not
consistent with preferences, no U.S. government participation, and no dissent).
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Figure 2. Interaction of Ideological Extremity and Legal Complexity.
Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at moderate
judge, in the majority of the circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S.
government participation, and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference
in the probability between a moderate and an ideologically extreme judge are not statistically
different from one another.
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Table 2: Likelihood of a Sincere Vote
Subsample: Civil and Criminal Cases
Model 4a:
Civil Cases
Coefficient
(RSE)
Ideology and complexity variables
Legal
.106
complexity
(.090)
Ideology
.465**
(.180)
Extreme
-.471**
ideology
(.080)
Ideology*legal
-.060
complexity
(.069)
Extreme*legal
-complexity
Control variables
Non-unanimous
.270*
(.139)
Member of
.264**
majority party in
(.042)
circuit
Cross appeal
-.140
(.135)
U.S. government
.826**
(.079)
Lower court
2.96**
decision
(.099)
Ideo. distance
.146
from panel
(.149)
Constant
-.671**
(.136)
N
7281
Prob > chi2
p < .001
Pseudo R2
.3382

Model 4b:
Civil Cases
Coefficient
(RSE)

Model 5a:
Criminal
Cases
Coefficient
(RSE)

Model 5b:
Criminal
Cases
Coefficient
(RSE)

.065
(.108)
.333**
(.099)
-.581**
(.157)
--

.186
(.213)
2.55
(.457)
.127
(.222)
.541*
(.212)
--

-.047
(.189)
3.55**
(.251)
.128
(.374)
--

.272*
(.139)
.263**
(.042)

.644
(.434)
.466**
(.073)

.622
(.421)
.452**
(.072)

-.142
(.135)
.825**
(.079)
2.97**
(.099)
.142
(.149)
-.613**
(.160)
7281
p < .001
.3382

1.10
(.583)
.720**
(.095)
2.88**
(.220)
-.704*
(.344)
-.541
(.301)
4111
p < .001
.6721

1.11
(.582)
.742**
(.093)
2.89**
(.221)
-.723*
(.346)
-.247
(.282)
4111
p < .001
.6703

.052
(.065)

-.014
(.118)

Notes: **p < .01, *p < .05, two-tailed tests. All marginal effects and standard errors were
calculated for all interaction terms, but the only statistically significant relationship was in Model
4b. This effect is graphed in Figure 3. (Other graphs are omitted because of space.)
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Figure 3. Interaction of Ideological Extremity and Legal Complexity.
Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at majority of the
circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S. government participation,
and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference in the probability between
a moderate and an ideologically extreme judge are not statistically different from one another.
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Appendix A: Legal Issues Included in the Legal Complexity Variable
Criminal
Civil
Civil con’t
Prejudicial conduct by
prosecution
Insanity defense
Improper influence on jury
Jury instructions improper
Jury composition or selection
Death penalty
Sentence improperly imposed
Indictment defective

Due process

De novo

Executive order

Clearly erroneous standard

State policy

Agency discretion

Weight of the evidence

Decision subject to judicial
review

Pre-trial procedure
Procedure at trial

Agency used appropriate
standard or interpretation

Post-trial procedure/motion

Notice given

Attorneys fees

Administrative law judge

Abuse of discretion

Confession improperly
admitted

Alternative dispute resolution

Agency acquisition of
information

Search and seizure

Injunction

Freedom of Information

Admissibility of evidence

Summary judgment

Comment

Challenges to plea bargain

Conflict between state and
federal law

Record adequately developed

Conflict between domestic
law and foreign law

Which law (in diversity
conflicts)

Inadequate counsel
Right to counsel violated
Sufficiency of evidence for
conviction

Diversity of parties

International law

Indigent rights

Conflict of laws between
states

Entrapment

Discovery

Dismissal by lower court
upheld on procedural grounds

Other civil issue that favored
appellant

Did court rule for defendant
on other grounds

Substantial evidence rule
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Notes
i

See Bonneau and Hall (2009) for a similar argument in the context of judicial elections.

ii

This is also referred to in terms of “salience.”

iii

As a caveat, it should be noted that for judges in different institutional environments, some of

the prerequisites for the behavior described by Segal and Spaeth are not satisfied. For instance,
lower federal court judges and many state court judges have little or no say in choosing which
cases they will hear. In addition, they may be motivated by ambition for higher judicial office,
or constrained by the possibility of reversal by a higher court.
iv

See Bartels (2009) for a newer strain of scholarship that acknowledges the role of both law and

ideology in judicial decision making.
v

The literature on political attitudes and behavior has also recognized that, in some situations,

ideology is malleable, and might be issue-specific. However, I follow Jost et al. (2003, 342 fn2)
in assuming that we can distinguish between a stable core of beliefs that are associated with
individual ideology (e.g., preferences about change, inequality, and order) and attitudes on
specific issues (e.g., crime).
vi

The motivated reasoning account suggests a biased decision process, by which decision makers

are predisposed to find authorities consistent with their ideological preferences more convincing
than authorities that conflict with those preferences.
vii

While the Supreme Court also operates by majority rule, substantially different norms exist in

that institution about separate opinion writing. From 1950 to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court
maintained a dissent rate that was well above fifty percent (Haynie 1992), compared to a dissent
rate of 7 percent on the Courts of Appeals during the same period (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire
2000). As a result of the prevalence of consensus, the median judge on a Courts of Appeals
34

panel yields more of an influence over her colleagues, in terms of the ideological direction of the
court’s opinion, than the median justice on the Supreme Court.
viii

Yearly terminations on the merits is a preferable measure to total filings, since the latter does

not signify whether the court considered the arguments and resolved the case in that year.
ix

x

Interview with the author (December 2008).
One limitation of using the headnotes variable is that it is truncated by the number of fields

coded in the Songer database (the variable ranges from 0 to 7).
xi

The substantive findings are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable in

which a sincere vote is coded as a dichotomy based on the judge ideology scores, rather than
party of appointing president. (See Appendix C.)
xii

I also ran the models using a cross-sectional time-series analysis (Zorn 2001). As the results of

both methods were substantively equivalent, I report the logit results for ease of interpretation.
Another alternative specification would be to include fixed effects to control for circuit-specific
tendencies. However, introducing these controls produces unacceptably high levels of
collinearity with the Majority variable (>.90), so I opted not to include them.
xiii

When the observations are separated by party of appointing president, 24 percent of all

Democratic judge-votes were classified as coming from “extreme” judges, while 40 percent of
all Republican judge-votes had this designation.
xiv

This measure does not tap into the relative weight of each issue, or into the court’s ruling on

each issue. In addition, the dependent variable in the analysis is coded relative to the outcome of
the entire case, so it is possible that in case with multiple issues, some, but not necessarily all, of
these issues will have been decided consistent with the outcome of the case.
35

xv

The legal concepts were coded as part of the Multi-User database to reflect whether the court

addressed the issue in a way that favored the appellant, the appellee, both (mixed decisions), or if
the court did not address the issue at all. My coding scheme simply notes whether the court
addressed the issue at all, regardless of which side prevailed and sums the number of issues
addressed by the court in its majority opinion.
xvi

When the value for Lower Court is set at 1, the probability of sincere voting for liberal and

conservative judges increase dramatically, reflecting the powerful effect of this control variable.
Liberal judges’ probabilities range from .91 to .92 (compared to .35 to .39 when Lower Court is
equal to 0), while a conservative judge goes from .98 to .99 (compared to .62 - .65). After Legal
Complexity exceeds 3, the differences between liberal and conservative judges are no longer
statistically different from one another.
xvii

Supplemental analyses were also conducted using only civil rights and liberties cases, since

ideology may be more salient in such cases. However, the substantive findings remain largely the
same. The only difference is that the Extreme weakens in statistical significance from p < .001 to
p < .10.
xviii

When the models are estimated without the interaction terms, Legal Complexity fails to reach

conventional levels of significance, and the results largely mirror the findings in Table 1.
xix

This is not to say that liberal or conservative judges consciously rely on shortcuts in the place

of legal arguments, or that they are simply trying to decide cases quickly without regard to the
quality of their work; indeed, there is ample evidence that judges value and strive to produce
high quality legal work every time a case comes before them.
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